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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINlSTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name:· Banister, Jerome Facility: Otisville CF 
NYSID: 
DIN: 98-A-4600 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
01-069-19 B 
Appearances: Jerome Banister 98A4600 
Otisville Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 8 
Otisville, New York 10963 
Decision appealed: January 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Board Member(s) Cruse, Alexander, Berliner 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received April 5, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
Th/dersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
/_ Affi irmed _·_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ __ _ 
~ 
Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~ed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commisstoner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the sep~r.,te ~~ings,9f 
the Parole Board, if any, .w~re mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ~h/151 Zb . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit_, Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Banister, Jerome DIN: 98-A-4600  
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     Appellant challenges the January 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant is convicted of raping a 12 year old girl by force.  Appellant 
raises the following issues: 1) the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required 
statutory factors. 2) no aggravating factors exist. 3) the decision lacks substantial evidence. 4) the 
Board failed to cite facts in support of the statutory standards referred to. 5) the decision lacks 
future guidance. 6) the decision lacks detail. 7) the Board ignored the wishes of the court minimum 
and illegally resentenced him. 8) community opposition is not allowed. 9) the decision violated 
the due process clause. 10) the decision violated appellant’s constitutional legitimate interest in an 
expectation of early release. 11) the decision violated his right to counsel, to see all the evidence 
against him. 12) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law and 
the 2017 regulations in that they create a constitutional liberty interest, but the COMPAS was 
ignored, and no reason for departure was given. 
 
     Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
     Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered 
other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered.  Matter 
of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 
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N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 
(3d Dept. 2017).   
 
    The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
     The record further shows appellant attempted to minimize his crime during the interview.  
Matter of Serrano v. New York State Exec. Dep’t-Div. of Parole, 261 A.D.2d 163, 164, 689 
N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept. 1999).  
 
    The Board is not required to give each statutory factor equal weight nor articulate every factor 
in its decision, and the placement of greater emphasis on petitioner's criminal history, including 
his prior failures to adjust to parole supervision, does not demonstrate ‘irrationality bordering on 
impropriety’. Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013). 
 
   The Board may cite the failure of the inmate to acknowledge the impact of the criminal conduct on 
his victims. Gaito v New York State Board of Parole, 238 A.D.2d 634, 655 N.Y.S.2d 692 (3d Dept 
1997);  Romer v Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dept. 2005). 
     The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     The Board did not cite any potential community opposition in its decision, so this issue is moot. 
But it is in any event permissible. .  Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 
A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018). 
    That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).   
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     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
    As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
    Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
    An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in 
parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter 
of Motti v. Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 114, 115, 863 N.Y.S.2d 839, 839-40 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of 
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Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d Dept. 
2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
   Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on 
which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
    Appellant’s challenge appears to be based in part upon the mistaken impression that an 
appearance before the Board is a formal hearing in which documentary and testimonial evidence 
is introduced.  However, a parole interview is not an adversarial proceeding; rather, the Board 
conducts an informal interview which is intended to function as a non-adversarial discussion 
between the inmate and panel as part of an administrative inquiry into the inmate’s suitability for 
release.  Matter of Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 28, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704, 
710 (1969); Matter of Banks v. Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 144, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515, 522 (2d Dept. 
2018).   
     There are no substantial evidence issues in a Parole Board Release Interview. Valderrama v 
Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dept. 2005); Tatta v Dennison, 26 A.D.3d 663, 
809 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dept. 2006)  lv.den. 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 N.Y.S.2d 750; Harris v New York 
State Division of Parole, 211 A.D.2d 205, 628 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dept. 1995).   A substantial 
evidence issue arises only where a quasi-judicial hearing has been held and evidence has been taken 
pursuant to law. If no hearing was held, the issue does not arise. Horace v Annucci, 133 A.D.3d 
1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). A proceeding to determine whether an inmate should be 
released on parole is not a quasi-judicial hearing. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 
515 (2d Dept. 2018). 
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
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         Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law 
amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
     The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. The 
2017 amended regulations don’t create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase 
transparency in the final decision. Courts must defer to the Parole Board’s interpretation of its own 
regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 
1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018). 
     The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other 
statutory factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017); accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
The COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result, and declining to afford the COMPAS 
controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 
1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the 
Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three 
standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 
990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 
N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     The Board decision did depart from the COMPAS, but the departure did comply with the 
applicable regulation. Specifically, the Board decision believed there is a reasonable probability 
appellant would reoffend and violate the law due to the quality of the instant offense, and 
minimization of the crime, and the victim’s age. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
